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 The Dodd-Frank Clawback Provision's Role in Creating a More Secure Corporate Governance 
Structure 
By Patrick T. Smith 
Introduction 
The "Great Recession" of2008 served as the catalyst for Congressional action on 
financial reform in the United States. 1The resulting calamity from credit default swap use by 
Lehman Brothers, Fannie and Freddie Mac and the American International Group produced 
populist uproar throughout the nation. 2 In response to the financial collapse, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The "Reform Act" overhauls 
federal financial regulation in a number of ways. Dodd-Frank provisions attempt to end the 
reviled "too big to fail" policy while adding a number of new securities regulation requirements. 
The "Reform Act" also introduces a number of provisions applicable to internal corporate 
governance. These corporate governance provisions include a "say on pay" provision requiring a 
non-binding vote by stockholders on executive pay, disclosure of executive compensation, 
establishment of independent compensation committees and mandatory adoption of provisions 
allowing for the claw back of incentive based executive compensation. 3 
The following paper illustrates how Dodd-Frank's changes in incentive-based executive 
compensation clawback provisions serve as a lynchpin in a broader effort to enforce 
accountability amongst executive officers. Dodd-Frank's clawback requirement does not serve to 
impede excessive executive compensation. The clawback provision's intention is two-fold. First, 
the provision is intended to bring greater accountability to financial institutions. Second, the 
1 Adam Nagourney, Bracing for a Backlash Over Wall Street Bailouts, New York Times, Mar. 16, 2009, at A1. 
2 1d. 
3 th ( ) H.R. 4173, 111 Cong. 2010. 
Dodd-Frank claw back provision attempts to create a more secure avenue of investment for 
potential and current shareholders of publicly held corporations. Still, the legislation enacted in 
the shadow of the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression falls just short of the 
American public's true goal; regulation meant to stop the next Wall Street collapse. Dodd-Fran..\: 
does accomplish the goal of Congress, restoring faith in the American economy. 
Section I discusses the definition of the term "clawback", how it has been interpreted in 
court, and the limits imposed by the language of the statute. Sections II and III examine the 
historical context in which the claw back provisions were enacted under both the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. Section IV examines the differences between the clawback 
provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank. Section V details the specific improvements 
made in Dodd-Frank's newly enacted clawback policy. Section VI addresses objections made to 
the clawback policy adopted in Dodd-Frank. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the improvements 
made to the claw back provision, addressing the greater context of corporate governance 
provisions in Dodd-Frank and how the "Reform Act" creates a more accountable and trustworthy 
financial system for investors. 
In their article "Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive 
Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes", Professors Miriam Cherry and J arrod Wong 
define claw back as ~~a theory for recovering benefits that have been conferred under a claim of 
right, but that are nonetheless recoverable because unfairness would otherwise result." 4 Cherry 
and Wong proceed to distinguish between two distinctive types of claw backs .. The first type, the 
4 Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod VVong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive 
Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 368, 371-72 (2009} 
retroactive claw back, is "imposed after the contractual right to the bonuses has arisen and the 
benefits have occurred." 5 Attempts to tax excessive executive compensation after the company 
confers serve as an example of a retroactive claw back. The second category, the prospective 
claw back, is written into an investment or employment contract before the time the benefit can 
be claimed. 6 The claw back provision in Dodd-Frank exemplifies the prospective clawback. 
Because Dodd-Frank's claw back provision only provides for prospective claw backs, this article 
will not consider the merits of retroactive claw backs. 
While serving as its own recursive definition, the term "claw back" was originally coined 
by the press in describing federal action through section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 
304, entitled ''Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits", creates an avenue of enforcement for 
the SEC to "clawback" incentive based compensation earned under false pretenses. The statute 
provides that the company's CEO and CFO must disgorge any incentive-based compensation 
received 12 months prior to the filing of the restatement if an accounting restatement is filed as a 
result of misconduct resulting in material noncompliance with SEC reporting requirements. 7 
Although a number of companies adopted claw backs into their employment contracts following 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the provision did not make adoption mandatory. 8 
Adoption of a broad statute by the SEC left a number of issues to the discretion of the 
courts. The most influential of those cases was 201O's SEC v. Jenkins. The Jenkins decision 
involved the CEO of CSK Auto Corporation, an auto parts retail company. 9 According to the 
complaint, CSK reported greater pretax profits under a vendor allowance program than were 
5 I d. at 373. 
6 ld. 
7 th ( ) H.R. 3763, 107 Cong. 2002 . 
8 Paul Hodgson~ 2008 Proxy Season Foresights #11: C/awback Policies, Governance Metrics International (June 4, 
2008), http:/ /www2.gmiratings. com/reports. ph p ?reportid=197 &keyword=clawback. 
9 SEC v Jenkins, 718 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1072 (D.AZ 2010). 
actually earned. 10 Maynard Jenkins, the CEO ofCSK, was not alleged to have taken part in the 
fraudulent concealment of false profits perpetrated by fellow CSK officers. 11 He had however 
profited from those misstatements through bonuses and other incentive-based payments. 12 The 
court held that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not require personal misconduct on behalf of the 
CEO or CFO to trigger the claw back provision. 13 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals first held that no private right existed under SOX's 
claw-back provisions dealing in the matter of Digimarc Corporation's Derivative Litigation in 
Diaz v. Davis. 14 Digimarc involved a shareholders action against corporate officers alleging a 
breach of :fiduciary duties in breach of section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley i\ct. 15 The court noted 
that in other section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, private rights of action had been specifically 
provided for through the language of the statute. 1~o such language was present in section 304. 
Following the Digimarc ruling, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals additionally found that a 
settlement agreement could not release a CEO or CFO from liability under Sarbanes-Oxley 
provisions. 17 Cohen v. Viray involved an employment agreement releasing and indemnifying the 
CEO and CFO ofDHB Industries Inc. against any liability under section 304 of the Sarbanes'-
Oxley Act. 18 The Court held that such an agreement was an attempted end-around SEC action 
that '~vitiates the SEC's role and is inconsistent with the law." 19 
Following the world wide recession of2008, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act. 




13 Jd. at 1074. 
14 Diaz v. Davis {In re Digimarc Corp.)~ 549 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 2008). 
15 Jd. 
16 !d. at 1230. 
17 Cohen v. Viray? 622 F.3d 188, 192 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
18/d. 
19 ld. at 195. 
and implement a policy to recover from any former executive officer any excessive incentive 
based commission over a three year period. Additionally, subsection (a) of the law requires that 
all publicly listed companies adopt a claw back provision or risk being delisted from national 
securities exchanges. 20 
American courts have not yet had an opportunity to encounter Dodd-Frank's section 954 
clawback provision. It is assumed the Courts will continue finding no implied private right for 
shareholders. 21 Still, the new claw back provision includes a number of changes. To fully 
understand these changes, it is important to comprehend the context in which each form of the 
clawback provision was adopted, and Congress' intention in doing so. 
II. Historical Context of the Origins of Claw back Provisions: Enron and the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 
The Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals of2001 served as the impetus for 
developing a policy to recover erroneously awarded compensation, or, as it would later become 
known, the claw back provision. 22 The original claw back provision was part of federal 
legislation known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. Sarbanes-Oxley was largely the product of 
the corporate accounting scandals and the ensuing exposure of compensation schemes that 
rewarded vast benefits to corporate executives based on faulty profits. 23 Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the intent of preventing further corporate accounting scandals and 
changing corporate governance in ways that would prohibit the types of executive compensation 
schemes used by those fraudulent institutions. 
20 See supra note 3. 
21 Robert E. Scully, Executive Compensation~ the Business Judgment Rule? and the Dodd-Frank Act: Back to the 
Future for Private Litigation?, 58-JAN Fed.Law.36, 40 (2011}. 
22Bernhard Kuschnik, The Sarbanes Oxley Act: "Big Brother is watching" you or Adequate Measures of Corporate 
Governance Regulation? 5 Rutgers Bus. Law Journal, 64,67 (2008}. 
23 Jd. 
The Enron Corporation, an energy and commodities company known for its influence in 
internatiop.al energies markets, at the time served as the pinnacle of American corporate greed. 24 
Through their use of mark to market accounting, Executive Officers at Enron inflated stock 
prices by listing as assets profits that had not yet come to fruition. At one time selling for over 
ninety dollars a share, Enron would file for chapter 11 bankruptcy in late 2001, taking with it 
over 20,000 jobs and driving stock prices down to less than a dollar a share. 25 Until the chapter 
11 bankruptcy filings ofWorldCom and later Lehman Brothers, Enron stood as the largest single 
financial catastrophe in the history of the financial world. 26 
The year of2001 \Vas notable for reasons other than the corporate accounting scandals 
previously mentioned. On September 21st, 2001, a symbol of American prosperity and financial 
dominance was attacked when nineteen terrorists high-jacked four commercial planes, flying two 
of the planes into the Twin Towers. 27 The effect of the terrorist attacks on both Wall Street and 
Main Street in many ways dwarfed any attempts by Congress to curb those corporate governance 
abuses. Adopted approximately a year following the 9/11 attacks, the Sarbanes-Oxley i\ct was 
intended to address corporate accounting abuses and the issues surrou1'1ding those scat1dals. Not 
until the events surrounding the 2008 Recession did Congress have the intent or the political 
support to implement financial regulation expansive enough to significantly affect the governing 
structures of American corporations. 
Sarbanes-Oxley' s claw back provision served more as a last resort for federal authorities 
than as a tool for investors to increase corporate accountability. The aim of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
24 Bethany Mclean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room, (2004). 
25 /d. 
26 Sam Mamudi, Lehman folds with record $613 biJJion debt~ Marketwatch.com, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http:/ /www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid::::rss. 
27 Serge Schmemann, U.S. ATTACKED; President Vows to Exact Punishment for 'Evir, New York Times, Sept. 12, 
2001, at Al. 
was to curtail fraudulent corporate accounting practices. Corporate governance played a less 
significant role in Sarbanes-Oxley than it would eight years later in Dodd-Frank. Through 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress sought to prevent fraudulent corporate accounting from causing a 
greater financial meltdown. 28 The claw back provision served as a way to hold CEOs and CFOs 
accountable for fraudulent practices occurring in their company even if claiming ignorance of the 
purported fraudulence. The claw back provision was a direct response to the claims by Enron 
CEO Jeff Skilling and CFO Ken Lay that they were unaware of the fraud being committed on 
their watch. 29 
Congress adopted the original claw back provision intending to prevent corporate 
accounting malpractice. 30 The fraudulent practices of Enron and W orldCom were fresh in 
Congress' mind when they included the misconduct requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley's clawback 
provision. 31 Not until the financial recession of2008 did Congress would begin considering 
claw back measures for incompetent and uninformed executive officers as a potent weapon in 
maintaining the integrity of the American financial system. The following section describes the 
context under which the claw back provision morphed from an afterthought of corporate 
accounting malpractice legislation to a central tool in restoring faith in the American fmancial 
system through stronger corporate governance. 
III. Historical Context of the Origins of Claw-back Provisions: The 2008 Economic 
Crisis and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
28 See supra note 19. 
29 See supra note 21. 
30 See supra note 19. 
31 See supra note 19. 
Beginning in 2007, the United States experienced its greatest economic recession since 
the Great Depression. Reckless lending practices involving the use of mortgage backed securities 
caused the collapse of a number of major American financial institutions. Amidst a worldwide 
housing bubble, financial institutions made huge gains by offering adjustable-rate mortgages to 
financially unreliable individuals. Banks then packaged these mortgages into mortgage backed 
securities. Willing investors were offered these mortgage backed securities at lower rates in 
exchange for one time cash payments. As introductory rates on adjustable rate mortgages 
expired, both mortgage rates and defaults rose sharply. With the burst of the housing bubble, 
bank profits based on instruments heavily reliant on mortgage backed securities fell dramatically. 
The consequences were felt worldwide, culminating in the collapse of such financial juggernauts 
as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stems. 32 
The financial downturn resulted in high unemployment, losses to pension funds and 
nation-wide public outrage directed towards the powers that be on Wall Street. 33 In 2008, 
Senator Bara..l( Obama was elected President of the United States, s·wept into office by the 
public's demand for financial reform. 34 As foreclosures and uner.o.ployment rose to record levels, 
the American people decried the perceived arrogance and hypocrisy exuding from corporate 
boardrooms throughout the country. 35Financial reform became the top priority of a newly 
elected Congress and President. 36 
32 Stephen Labaton, Agency"s 04" Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, The New York Times, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1. 
33 Mark Trumbull, Eight Ways the Great Recession has Changed Americans, The Christian Science Monitor, June 30, 
2010, http:/ /www.csmonitor.com/Business/2010/0630/Eight-ways-the-Great-Recession-has-changed-Americans. 
34 Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, The New York Times, Nov. 4, 2008, at Al. 
35 Mark Decambre, Rage and Record Earnings at Goldman, New York Post, Jan. 22, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/rage_and_record_earnings_at_goldman_2r8mQ09LXxlxAFjSyXa4VK 
36 Sue Chang, Obama Urges Congress to Pass Wall Si:reet Reforms, MarketvVatch.com, June 26, 2010, 
http:/ /www.marketwatch.com/story/obama-urges-congress-to-pass-wall-street-reforms-2010-06-26. 
As anti-Wall Street fervor mounted, Congress slowly began to act. Protests came from 
both sides of the aisle when then President Bush enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of2008. 37 • Public outrage reached its apex when it was discovered that executive officers 
of companies accepting tax-payer provided assistance were being rewarded with multimillion 
dollar bonuses. Congressional action was taken to recoup those bonuses by way of heavy tax 
burdens. 38For Congress, extinguishing the flames of public anger scorching Wall Street was not 
the only concern. More importantly, Americans had lost faith in the economy. 39 Restoring faith 
in the economy was the United States government's driving intention. One of the major concerns 
confronting Congress as they began developing reform legislation was the issue of executive 
compensation. Congress sought a way to provide transparency and accountability in addressing 
public concerns over corporate governance and executive compensation procedures. 40 
The American public's reaction was massive to 2008's TARP legislation. As middle 
class families struggled through cuts in work hours and job losses, the federal government was 
supplying billions of taxpayer dollars in "bailout funds" to the very individuals that had created 
the financial downturn. To the average American, it seemed as if the two most powerful beings 
in America, Washington and Wall Street, were working together against anyone not making a six 
figure salary. The backlash was unbridled and in many ways, became illogical. Lack of 
regulation had led to a mortgage industry in which fraud had been made legal. Investment banks 
devised ways not only to make money off of the sale of mortgage-backed securities, but to profit 
37 Ken Bensinger Masses Aren't Buying Bailout, The Los Angeles Times, Sept. 26, 2008, 
http:/ /articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/26/business/fi-voxpop26 
38 Helen Kennedy, A/G Bonus Checks May be Taxed at up to 100%, The New York Daily News, Mar. 17, 2009, 
39 Jim Kuhnhenn, Poll: Financially Pinched, Young Adults Lose Faith, Bloomberg Business Week, March 9, 2010, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/03/17/2009-03-
17 _aig_bonus_checks_may_be_taxed_at_up_to_1.html 
40 156 Cong. Rec. H5233-01, 2010 WL 2605437 (Cong. Rec.) 
from their demise after the banks realized they would not succeed. Anti-government and Wall 
Street anger spread from anti-Tarp protests to anti-Wall Street reform protests~ 
Somehow, Americans had confused the necessity of bailing out 'i'/all Street with the 
productivity in reforming Wall Street regulation. Through the imperfect system that is the 
American Congress in the 21st century, Wall Street received a law that would accomplish that 
which it set out to do, and nothing more. 
Two years after the beginning of America's financial downturn, President Barack Obama 
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law. On July 10, 
2010, Congress adopted legislation meant to address the mortgage backed securities scandal as 
well as quell public concerns over executive compensation. The Act included new securities 
disclosure requirements, attempted to abolish the abhorrent "Too Big to Fail" Policy despised by 
the public, and contained a number of corporate governance requirements intended to restore 
investor faith in the American economy. 41 
The corporate governance requirements included in Dodd-Frank were intended to provide 
greater "accountability and transparency in the financial system". 42 Title XI of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, entitled ''Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities", includes a 
number of corporate governance provisions. Among Title IX' s sections is a "Say on Pay'' vote 
requirement, a whistleblower protection provision and a mandatory claw back provision. 43 
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled "Recovery of Erroneously Awarded 
Compensation", requires that all publicly-listed companies incorporate a claw back provision of 
incentive based compensation in the event that the company must prepare an accounting 
41 See supra note 3. 
42 H.R. 4173 Title Page, 111th Cong. (2010). 
43 • th H.R. 4173, Title IX, 111 Cong. (2010). 
restatement of its finances. 44 The Dodd-Frank claw back contains marked improvements when 
compared to the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback provision. Those improvements, when placed in the 
greater context of corporate governance restructuring within Dodd-Frank, provide for greater 
accountability and transparency within corporate America. In order to appreciate the 
improvements made betwe~n Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, it is vital to investigate and 
compare the differences between the two provisions. 
IV. Comparing the Sarbanes-Oxley Claw-Back Provision with the Dodd-Frank Claw-
back Provision 
The claw back provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts differ in 
a number of ways. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applied only to the Chief Financial and Chief 
Executive Officer of the corporation. In contrast, Dodd-Frank applies to all ••executive officers"" 
receiving incentive based compensation. 45 Second, the time period contained in the Dodd-Frank 
Act was extended to a three year window, an increase from the one year time limit imposed in 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 46 Third, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's claw back provisions applied to all incentive 
based compensation. The Dodd-Frank Act has limited this power to the amount of incentive 
based compensation awarded to an executive over that which they would have earned based on 
the restatement. 47 
The Dodd-Frank Act has also eliminated Sarbanes-Oxley' s requirement that some sort of 
"misconduct" occur. Under Dodd-Frank, the production of an accounting restatement suffices to 
trigger the claw back provision. Finally, Dodd-Frank made adoption of a claw back policy 
44 /d. 
45 T. Gorman, Dodd-Frank: Clawback, www.secaction.com. (Sept. 9, 2010), www.secactions.com/p==2564. 
46/d. 
47 id. 
mandatory on all publicly listed companies. Failure to implement a claw back provision on 
executive officers will result in the company being delisted from the national securities 
exchange. 48 
The Dodd-Frank clawback provision also contains its limits. Critics point to the 
continued lack of a statutorily provided private action for shareholders. 49 Although the issue is 
yet to be encountered in American Courts, prevailing wisdom is that clawbacks will continue to 
be barred from use in private rights of action. 5° Furthermore, the SEC remains the lone enforcer 
of Section 954 outside of the corporate world. 51 The single greatest point of contention 
surrounding Dodd-Frank's clawback policy remains its inability to curb excessive corporate 
compensation. Still, the benefits of the new and improved claw back provision far outweigh the 
potential drawbacks. 
Sarbanes-Oxley' s claw back provision was not without its faults. First, adoption of a 
claw back provision was not mandatory. As a result, the SEC stood as the single enforcer of the 
clawback provision. 52 Additionally, the provision's use as a tool is severely narrowed by its lack 
of a private ri&~t of action. Liability only extended to the CEOs and CFOs UJ.J.der the SOX 
claw back provision; shielding federal accountability from the majority of executive officers. 
Sarbanes-Oxley also required misconduct before the claw back provision kick in. 53 
V. An Overview of the Improvements of the Dodd-Frank Act's Claw-back Provision 
48 Jd. 
49 Doreen E. Lilienfeld & Kenneth J. Laverriere, The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 on Executive Compensation, 2011 WL 190439 (2011). 
50 See supra note 17 
51/d. 
52 Jd. 
53 Harold S. Blumenthal, Sarbanes-Ox/ey Act in Perspective 11:6, SEC-SOAP 11:6 (2010). 
The proceeding six sections address specific improvements of claw back provisions 
provided by the Dodd-Frank Act. Improvements made through the changes, as well as legal and 
financial issues arising from those changes will be addressed .. The first improvement, removal of 
the misconduct requirement, establishes the claw back as a remedial form of enforcement while 
providing for greater fairness to investors. The second improyement, the application of 
claw backs to all executive officers, widens the reach of the clawback provision and in doing do, 
strengthens the shareholders position .. Third, limiting the clawback remedy to incentive based 
compensation ensures that executives that contractual employment obligations will be met by 
corporations while ensuring shareholders that incentive based compensation will not be paid 
without performance .. 
The extension of the time period of the claw back policy from one to three years deters 
companies from adopting policies like those used during the option backdating scandal. Finally, 
Dodd-Frank's requirement that all publicly listed companies adopt a clawback provision serves a 
wide range of favorable results. Among them are greater accountability of executive officers and 
the Board of Directors, an added level of pressure for executive officers to perform due diligence 
in running their companies, the establishment of further checks and balances between the Board 
of Directors and executive officers of a company, and a restored faith in investors that their 
investments will be used solely for the benefit of the company. 
a. Removal of the Misconduct Requirement 
The first major change in the claw back provision is the removal of the misconduct 
requirement. Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the SEC show misconduct leading to a financial 
misstatement in order to trigger the claw back provision. Dodd-Frank removed the misconduct 
hurdle. 54 The SEC would not need to demonstrate misconduct to claw back erroneously awarded 
compensation from executive officers. The Sarbanes-Oxley clawback provision served as a 
weapon against executive officers who chose to bury their heads in the sand while fraudulent 
activities earned the erroneously awarded compensation. In contrast, the Dodd-Frank clawback 
provision has been stripped of the misconduct requirement. 
The events surrounding each Act serve as convincing evidence of what each version of 
the clawback provision was meant to produce. The Sarbanes-Oxley claw back provision focused 
on fraudulent activities leading to unearned compensation by CEOs and CFOs. The actions 
Sarbanes-Oxley sought to address were ones deserving of punishment. The Dodd-Frank Act had 
grander intentions i.11. changing t.he claw back provision. By removing the misconduct 
requirement, Dodd-Frank has replaced the punishment aspect of the crime with the intention of 
making the investor feel safe and protected. Assurance that investor money is safe and not 
subject to deception and fraud serves to provide faith in the financial system. The same man who 
refuses to invest money in a place known for its fraudulent practice will balk at investing money 
in a business where one regularly earns more than they produced. 
The Dodd-Frank Act's section 954 states "that in the event that the issuer is required to 
prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer", the 
claw back will be triggered. 55 This language replaces the Sarbanes-Oxley misconduct 
requirement. The clawback provision is triggered when an accounting restatement is filed due to 
material noncompliance with any requirement under securities laws. The question becomes, what 
is "material noncompliance"? Material noncompliance is generally known as not complying 
54 See supra note 45. 
55 See supra note 3. 
with specific rules or material, often provided in the form of statutes or other legal instruments. 
Still, no formal definition is provided through the legislation. 
Removal of the misconduct requirement was not intended to punish innocent executive 
officers for the mistakes of those over which they have limited or no control. Removal of the 
misconduct requirement instead serves as way for investors and stockholders to evil the playing 
field. Gone are the days where corporate executives earned immense salaries only by steering 
clear of any fraudulent activities. With Dodd-Frank's adoption of a clawback provision lacking 
any misconduct requirement, Congress did not make any attempt to limit excessive executive 
compensation. Instead, they sent the message that executive officers will once again be forced to 
earn their excessive compensation 
b. Application to all "Executive Officers" 
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was only applicable to the CEO and CFO of a 
company. Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act is applicable to all "executive officers" of the 
company. This change represents an important step in defining clawback provisions as tools in 
the creation of a more efficient and inviting marketplace for investors. 56 
The historical context in which the claw back provisions were initially enacted provides a 
pristine picture of Congress' intent. The story of Enron executive Lou Pai serves as a perfect 
example of the type of occurrence Congress hoped to end. Pai served as CEO of Enron Energy 
Services, a venture capital division of Emon. During his time at Enron, Pai was regarded as a 
close confidant of Enron CFO Jeffery Skilling. Referred to as "the invisible CEO", Pai was an 
instrumental figure in the rise and eventual fall of the Emon Corporation. Just months prior to 
56 See supra note 45. 
the descent and eventual bankruptcy ofEnron, Pai cashed out and sold a large portion of his 
stock options, garnering over $250 million dollars in the process. Lou Pai has never been 
charged with criminal wrongdoing in court and has paid only $30 million dollars in an out of 
court settlement on charges of insider trading. Currently, Lou Pai is the second largest landowner 
in the state of Colorado. 57 
Taken in context, the intent of Congress to stop individuals like Lou Pai from profiting 
from fraudulent activities becomes clear. If meant to deter the mismanagement of a company's 
finances, Sarbanes-Oxley' s claw back provision casts a surprisingly shallow net in doing so. The 
incentive to maintain a spotless accounting record rests solely with the CEO and CFO. In large 
compa.tries, this provides for an almost impossible task for t.he cPief officers. The CEO and CFO 
of each company were not only liable for typos in the accounting books, but the individuals 
positioned just below them on the corporate ladder were now working from a distinct advantage; 
they could take risks while being guaranteed maximum reward. 
The Dodd-Frank Act increases the exposure of all "executive officers" in an effort to 
develop stronger accountability in the American financial system. No longer will the law bend to 
incompetency by executive officers not privileged to yet be among the top two individuals. Each 
and every one of the financial industry's decision makers will be paid for the product they 
produce. When placing their savings into a company, investors will know that every member of 
the company responsible for decisions that affect stock prices will be paid what they earn. Not 
only does the extension of claw back liability to all executive officers produce accountability in 
the investment world, it also creates a greater incentive among the powers that be to work 
together and create a better product. 
57 See supra note 24. 
c. Limiting Clawbacks to Incentive Based Compensation 
ln an attempt to address an earlier concern over claw back provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act 
limits claw backs to that incentive based compensation earned in excess of the compensation paid 
under the new accounting restatement. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, any bonus or incentive-based 
compensation gained in the event of an accounting restatement was liable for a claw back. 58 
Under this policy, tiered compensation schemes could become slippery slopes due to slight 
accounting errors. Dodd-Frank seeks to remedy this issue by only making the difference in 
compensation earned before the restatement and after the restatement liable to a claw back. 
By addressing this flaw in the SOX claw back provision, Congress has solidified its 
position that executive compensation should reflect the benefit provided to the stockholder. 
Executive officers should neither be overpaid nor underpaid for their services. The claw back 
provision does not serve as a tool to fight excessive executive compensation. Dodd-Frank's 
claw back provision serves as an equalizer between investor and executive officer, assuring the 
average stockholder that their money is only subject to the expected avenues of loss and gain. 
The new language of the clawback statute does produce a complicated issue. What is 
"incentive-based compensation"? The Dodd-Frank Act specifically names "stock options 
awarded as compensation" as a form of incentive based compensation. Keeping the intention of 
Congress in mind, "incentive-based compensation" can broadly be defined as any form of 
compensation that can be increased or decreased through deceptive or fraudulent practices. 
While Dodd-Frank does not require that the executive officer be involved or even aware of any 
wrongdoing for the clawback measure to be executed, it is important to note the legislation's 
58 Practical Guide to Corporate Governance and Accounting: Implementing the Requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act~ WGL-SOACT 304, 2005 WL 487767 (2005). 
intent; an end to the practice of basing executive compensation on projections of profits not yet 
realized. 59 Such a system, deplete of any form of checks and balances, rewards executives more 
for optimism than realistic assessments of production. 
d. Extension of Claw-back Period to Three Years 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's claw back provision contained a twelve month time period 
during which the SEC could enact the claw back provision against a CEO or CFO. Dodd-Frank 
has extended the time period to three years. The reasoning behind the extension of the time 
period to three years is obvious. The statute of limitations should not create a loophole for 
creative executive officers. The statute of limitations begins running with the filing of the 
financial restatement and applies to any incentive based pay paid to the executive during the 
three years previous to the day of the refilling of the restatement. 
Extending the time period during which performance based compensation is liable to 
claw backs provides greater accountability in the financial system for shareholders. Not all cases 
of fraud or accounting typos will be discovered within twelve months of their occurrence. 
Extending the time period to three years allows for greater ability and fairness for shareholders 
while minimizing the draw of misguided practices for executive officers. The extension of the 
time period from one to three years serves as another tool in producing an accountable and 
reality-based financial system. Of course, the previously discussed tools used in restoring trust 
and accountability in the American financial system would be worthless without Dodd-Frank's 
threat of being delisted without mandatory compliance with the clawback provisions. 
e. Mandatory Compliance and the Penalty of Delisting a Non-complying Corporation 
59 See supra note 3. 
The Reform Act requires that all publicly listed companies adopt a clawback policy or 
risk being delisted from the public exchange. Under SOX, individual clawback policies were 
only suggested by the SEC. Previously, the SEC had the power to enact claw backs on any 
publicly traded company, but limited resources resulted in selective enforcement of the federal 
claw back provision. While some corporations followed SOX's lead and willfully implemented 
claw back provisions into executive employment contracts, 60 the single greatest deterrent 
remained the SEC and the threat of federal litigation. 61 The threat of action by the SEC served 
more as a hindrance for executive boards than as an impetus to strengthen corporate governance. 
The additions of mandatory corporate compliance and being delisted from the national 
exchanges upon noncompliance serve to strengthen the "Reform Act's" attempts to create a more 
stable accountable corporate system. The burden of enforcement has been placed on corporate 
boards, solving the problems encountered when dealing with the limited resources of constant 
federal litigation. The SEC remains the clawback provision's sole enforcer outside of executive 
boardrooms, but the SECs role and overall burden have been greatly diminished. The threat of 
being delisted from the national exchanges, a fate unimaginable for the vast majority of 
corporations, serves as the perfect deterrent and greatest assurance of corporate compliance. 
VI. Arguments against Clawback Provisions 
There remain a number of concerns regarding the changes in corporate governance 
regulation. The following section explains each of those concerns and attempts to remedy those 
purported shortcomings through close analysis. 
60 Anne Cotter, An Analysis of Recently Adopted Clawback Provisions, Dodd-Frank.com, Dec. 27, 2010. 
61 See supra note 9. 
The first issue addressed is whether or not American corporate officers are in fact overpaid. 
In a 2009 article, Richard Prossner addressed this issue by comparing the income of American 
executives to that of international executives. 62 Mr. Prossner found that American executives 
made double the salary earned by their non-American counterparts. The reason for the large 
discrepancy in executive pay, according to Prossner, was the existence of large bonus and stock 
option compensation mechanisms in the employment contracts of American executives. 63 
Whether or not executive officers are overpaid is not an issue in this paper. The Dodd-
Frank Act does not curtail excessive compensation of corporate officers. Under Dodd-Frank, 
executive boards are well within their power to continue raising corporate salaries. The Dodd-
Franck A ..ct only requires that those sala..ry raises not be obtai..11ed fraudulently a..11d are disclosed to 
shareholders. Any argument that corporate executives are paid what they deserve finds no dissent 
in the text fDodd-Frank. In fact, the clawback policy guarantees it. 
There also exist some general concerns over how the newest version of the claw back 
provision came to be passed as part of the "Dodd-Frank Reform Act". Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge has borrowed :from Professor Roberta Romano 64 and found that the Dodd-Frank Act 
equates to "quack corporate governance". 65 To qualify as "quack" corporate governance, a law 
must (1) be enacted in response to a major economic crisis; (2) within the environment of that 
crisis; (3) in response to populist backlash; (4) at the federal level; (5) at the expense of state 
power; (6) supported by federal interest groups; (7) developed prior to the economic downturn 
62 Richard A. Prossner, Are American CEOs Overpaid_. and_. if so_. what if Anything should be Done about it?, 58 Duke 
l.J. 1013 (2009}. 
63 ld at 1020. 
64 Roberta Romanao, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521 
(2005). 
65 Stephen M. Bainbridge Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate Governance Round ii, (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. 
Research Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract==1673575. 
by an interest group and (8) supported by mixed empirical data that shows the proposal to be 
unwise. 66 Professor Bainbridge points to the rushed nature of the legislation as his central reason 
in not supporting the law. 
The first four requirements of the obviously negative connotation of quack governance 
suggest that when faced with an economic crisis, its best to do nothing. It is obvious that 
Professors Bainbridge and Romano do not favor government intervention in the economic field. 
Action in the face of crisis is not reactionary; it is the role of government. An economic crisis 
affects the country as a whole. Waiting for state action to experiment with potential remedies to 
current problems while the strongest tool in our pocket, the commerce power of the federal 
government, lays idle is unwise and irresponsible. By definition, a crisis demands immediate 
action. Often, immediate action can mean saving the jobs, homes and lives of those the 
government serves. Furthermore, the overriding theme of quack governance is that the provisions 
have not been tested and debated thoroughly enough to constitute dependable financial 
regulations. The federal claw back provision has been used by the federal government for almost 
ten years. Prepared corporate legislation does not equate to out-dated ideas from special interest 
groups. Often, those laws are well reasoned and researched steps in a logical progression toward 
productive regulation. 
Finally, there is the concern of making individuals return money they may have already 
spent. This concern is coupled with executive officers constantly being in fear that their savings 
will be disgorged. 67 Each of these concerns can be brushed aside with some common sense and 
leniency. Unless criminally indicted, no executive officer will be liable for the full amount of 
66 ld at 1. 
67 Michael C Macchiarola; In the Shadow of the Omniprescent Claw: In Response to Professors Cherry and Wong, 93 
Minn. L. Rev., Headnotes 1. (2010). 
their savings. In most cases, the amount will be a small percentage of their overall worth. In the 
extreme case that a burden is placed on the officer in paying back the fees, nothing in the statute 
bars payment plans from being worked out through the independent commission committees. 
Even if a payment plan would place a burden on a former executive officer, not having the 
money due to a purchase or investment will not be a sufficient answer for shareholders. 
VII. Conclusion 
In 1988, the American public became infatuated with an investment vehicle producing 
exorbitant profits for Wall Street investors. It seemed that Wall Street investment bankers had 
developed a way to profit directly at the expense of the stockholder. To make things better, only 
the world's most wealthy were in a position to take advantage of these opportunities if they so 
chose. The leveraged buyout had entered the lexicon of American kitchen tables with the 
competing bids of Kohlberg Kravis and the RJR executive team approaching $25 billion. As 
public outrage spiraled over reports of job cuts at one of America's oldest and most successful 
companies, only the insides of the boardrooms involved in the leveraged buyout ofRJR Nabisco 
were more tumultuous. 68 
The topic of the RJR Nabisco buyout is pertinent to the discussion of financial regulation 
and corporate governance because of the number of ways regulation could have improved the 
outcome. RJR Nabisco shareholders profited from the final outcome of the heated bidding 
process between the competing camps. Still, many stockholders, including a large number of 
RJR employees, wanted more than marked up stock prices. They wanted to retain employment. 
They wanted to keep their company in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. They wanted a say in 
their company. The American public shared the same concerns. Knowledge of a CEOs pay 
68 Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco, (1990). 
package became a factor in choosing a cigarette. More than anyone, the eventual owners ofRJR 
Nabisco would have greatly benefited from knowledge of how the corporation was governed. A 
major issue throughout the bidding process became an employment contract held by the 
executive officers at RJR so egregious it surprised even Wall Street. In short, disclosure is good 
for business. 
The rise of LBOs coincided with the rise of incentive-based executive compensation 
packages in the 80's. 69 The driving force behind the idea was in the "incentive". Each executive 
officer would work as hard as humanly possible for their personal benefit and, by association, the 
benefit of the shareholder. The market refused to consider that such a situation would produce 
executive officers driven by short term profits. The current executive is much more willing to 
ignore what is best for the company in the long term. 70 Long term risk in exchange for short 
term reward has become a way of life on Wall Street, and in part led to the 2008 financial 
collapse. 
Politicians will often speak of a '~free market" in which Americans can prosper to their 
hearts fullest content, unencumbered by the shackles of government regulation. The idea of a 
free market economy has become as American as apple pie in the past thirty years, representing 
more of a rallying cry than the laissez-faire economic belief it once embodied. In judging the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act, it is 
important to consider that apart from the "free market" we have all grown accustomed to, 
Americans also desire an "open market"; an open market in which information and ideas are n 
passed freely. Information such as executive compensation plans serves as a conduit for sound 
investment and reason. 
69 Janice K. McClendon, Bringing the Bull to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and 
Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L Review 971 {2004}. 
70 /d. 
Information serves as the greatest bargaining chip a lesser opponent could possess. In 
curtailing corporate waste, a stockholder deprived of information is at an insurmountable 
disadvantage compared to his opponent. The business judgment rule serves as a required barrier 
to frivolous action against an unpopular board, but the availability of information is mandatory if 
the corporate veil is to be pierced when executives step out of line. As new ways to step out of 
line are developed, so must stockholder abilities to fight such attempts. The corporate 
governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act together serve as just such a development in 
stockholder action. Reassurance through the granting of information and the guarantee of action 
only serves to reaffirm the faith of investors in the American econo1ny. 
To appreciate the full affect the mandatory claw back provision has on investor 
confidence, it is important to understand the value of the information supplied by other corporate 
governance provisions in Dodd-Frank. Requirements include a non-binding ~'say-on-pay'' vote 
by shareholders, independence of the commission committee, disclosures of executive 
compensation compared to average employee wage and company performance, disclosure of 
whether the positions of CEO and President are held by the same individual, and access to proxy 
solicitation materials for shareholders. 71 Each of these requirements provides the shareholder 
with information that helps to restore and maintain confidence in the economy. Potential 
investors also improve the basis upon which they invest their money. Investor knowledge that 
their money is relatively safe is reassuring. 
As trust grows in the investor, so too does the market's trust. Say on Pay votes may at 
times serve as an instrument to express shareholder frustration, but will more often serve as a 
confidence builder for corporate executives in their actions. Say on Pay votes can serve as 
magnets for individuals looking for safe investments. Low ratios of executive, average worker 
71 See supra note 45. 
pay can also serve as attractions for potential investors. Finally, the knowledge that selling one's 
investment is not the only resort if management takes an unpopular turn may retain a number of 
investors that previously would have sold their shares. Information provided through Dodd-
Frank's corporate governance provisions serves to rebuild the trust and reliance between 
corporation and investor that existed prior to the economy's doWI!fall. 
Nestled among those informational corporate governance requirements, the clawback 
serves as the hammer through which the other provisions gain their strength. Mandatory 
compliance with the claw back provision serves to build investor confidence in the market. 
American investors are not concerned so much with overpaid executive officers as they are with 
fraudulently paid executive officers. The claw back provision mandatory nature coupled with the 
required independence of the compensation committees serves to assure investors that the 
headlines they encountered of multi-million dollar bonuses for executives of bankrupt companies 
will not reappear. It is that confidence, confidence that the known fear will not reoccur, that 
reengages investors and strengthens the market. Punishment of the guilty in the Great Recession 
of2008 will continue in criminal courts and public opinion throughout the country. But it will 
not occur through corporate governance legislation. It is through corporate governance that faith 
will be restored in the American economy. 
